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PANEL: ADVANCING THE HUMAN FACTORS BUSINESS CASE
Paul Krois
Douglas Farrow
William Johnson
Federal Aviation Administration
Washington, D.C.
David Bair
Frontier Airlines
Denver, CO
In a time characterized by constrained budgets, competing demands for research and operational investments, and
pressures to show how projects provide immediate value, human factors is becoming more adept at how we justify
our costs and demonstrate the importance of our contributions. We assess practical approaches for advancing the
business case for human factors research and engineering using government and industry perspectives.
Assurance (FOQA), Advanced Qualification Program
(AQP), Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program
(VDRP), and the Internal Evaluation Program (IEP).
The seventh program, Line Operational Safety Audits
(LOSA), is not an FAA program per se. It is an
industry program originally funded by the FAA as a
research and development effort, but now a private
venture endorsed by the FAA and supported by an
FAA Advisory Circular (AC 120-90).

Introduction
There is an ongoing need to address human factors
issues highlighting contributions to safety, capacity,
and efficiency in daily operations. Key principles for
the human factors business case are integrated as part
of panelists’ presentations involving cost savings,
cost avoidance, and cost justification. The following
panelists’ summaries highlight key considerations.

While it is true that financial pressures have
increased on both industry and the FAA, safety
remains the overriding consideration in deciding
which lines of research receive funding. The FAA
has a very transparent, standardized and even-handed
approach for ranking, and hence funding, proposed
research and development projects according to
perceived safety need. Consideration for costjustification is an emerging trend as part of research
program assessment.

Voluntary Safety Program, Douglas Farrow
A major focus of research and development efforts in
human factors within the FAA’s Flight Standards
Service over the last 15 years has been in support of
furthering what the FAA refers to as the Voluntary
Safety Programs. These are seven programs for
which the FAA has never established a mandatory
regulatory requirement, but in which the FAA
strongly encourages industry participation. Because
these programs often represent an additional cost for
airlines, and because they all involve the certificate
holder sharing additional data with the FAA beyond
regulatory requirements, the FAA provides
regulatory incentives for participation. The FAA also
looks for ways to minimize the financial investments
required for these extra programs, both on the part of
industry and the FAA. The largest US air carriers
participate in most of these programs.

One long-serving FAA Division R&D Representative
lists the following as, historically, the most effective
components in cost-justifying R&D expenditures to
FAA upper management: Programs that standardize
practices, integrate with other programs, leverage FAA
resources, automate manual processes, improve the
efficiency of the FAA, or any combination thereof.
The FAA Flight Plan goal of accident reduction
underlies all of the justifications for all of these
programs. The cost avoidance of even a single
accident for an air carrier is substantial. In addition
to this general and generic cost avoidance
justification, individual programs have their own
unique financial justifications.

While these programs were originally developed and
managed by a variety of different FAA organizations
over the years, the FAA has gradually consolidated
all of them under a single program office within FAA
Headquarters.
The Voluntary Safety Programs
Branch currently provides oversight for the following
programs:
Aviation
Safety
Reporting
(Program/System) (ASRS), Aviation Safety Action
Program (ASAP), Flight Operations Quality
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with full motion devices in both initial and recurrent
training regimes, the FAA begins to lay the
groundwork for a possible unprecedented expansion
of lower order and lower cost devices, sharply cutting
industry training budgets while simultaneously easing
the FAA’s oversight workload, which is lighter for
fixed devices than for motion devices. A previous
study estimated the potential industry-wide cost
savings of moving training from full motion
simulators down to fixed based training devices to be
in the neighborhood of $67M per year for recurrent
airline pilot training alone. Because of the substantial
body of scientific evidence these studies appear to
refute, and because of significant political and
economic interests in extremely high fidelity devices,
no action should be anticipated on this issue in the
near future

The following is a sampling of recent human factors
research efforts sponsored by the Voluntary Safety
Programs Branch in order to support safety efforts.
Notice to Airmen (NOTAMS)
NOTAMS is an archaic system used to advise flight
crews of primarily tactical information about the
National Airspace System (NAS), such as
temporarily closed runways. It was developed
around ticker-tape technology before the basic human
factors of user-friendly text presentation were
understood. It is such a confusing mish-mash of
upper case letters, abbreviations, and obscure
symbols that inconsistencies over its use have been
cited in numerous accidents and incidents.
By completing a human factors analysis of the
NOTAMS system and collecting survey data from
pilots, the FAA was able to recommend modifications
to a seriously outdated system that is now recognized
as a frequent source of pilot error. The cost
consideration was the recognition that the system was
vital, but that the effectiveness of the system as
currently formatted and structured was becoming
increasingly problematic.
It was a matter of
maintaining the basic safety infrastructure of the NAS.
This is a case where the cost justification was based on
the generic formula of saving lives by reducing pilot
error, rather than by a side-by-side comparison of
maintaining versus replacing the system.

Aviation Causal Contributors for Event Report
Systems (ACCERS) Taxonomy
By examining over half a dozen taxonomies used for
safety event reporting, the FAA was able to come up
with an all-inclusive methodology for categorizing
safety event reports that met the accepted scientific
best practices for taxonomy development and was at
the same time sufficiently user-friendly to be reliably
employed by the pilot workforce. This project was
cost justified as laying the groundwork for the future
of FAA oversight. The future vision of FAA
oversight includes a downsizing of the inspection
function and an increasing reliance on auditing and
data analysis, hence the need for better taxonomies.
The future workforce required to support this new
oversight model is anticipated to be less expensive, as
it will include fewer former pilots, dispatchers and
maintenance technicians and more data analysts and
automated functions.

Rapidly Reconfigurable Event Set Generator
(RRLOE)
By developing a standardized methodology for
quickly and effectively developing realistic scenarios
for training and checking pilot performance, the FAA
was able to slash the cost of evaluating pilot human
factors skills, while simultaneously lowering the
amount of time required by the FAA to review and
approve each such scenario. Because scenarios are
routinely developed by the pilot workforce, and
because each fleet within the airline needs 3-6 new
scenarios each year, the ability to reduce a five
person-week task down to less than 30 minutes has
saved the air carrier community millions of dollars
each year in avoided costs. It has also saved the FAA
hundreds of hours of review time in the approval of
these scenarios. The majority of air carriers have
adopted the methodology pioneered by this toolset.

Line Operations Safety Audit, David Bair
This presentation discusses the investment in the use
of LOSA methodology and will highlight how LOSA
results, when implemented proactively will improve
the flight operation. Line Operations Safety Audit
(LOSA) is an industry best practice for measuring
normal crew behaviors and performance during
regular scheduled line flights over a specified time
period of data collection using trained observers in
the cockpit jump seat. Developed by the University
of Texas in Austin and the LOSA Collaborative,
LOSA mandates 10 operating characteristics that
serve to define and direct the activities during and
after the audit and serves to protect the true intent of
this voluntary, non-jeopardy data driven safety
program. Recently AC 120-90 has been adopted and

Simulator Fidelity
By demonstrating the unpredicted efficacy of nonmotion simulation devices to compete effectively
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serves as the latest guide to operators for
implementing LOSA. Ultimately the best use of
LOSA is to enfold the audit into the safety change
process by conducting additional audits every 3 to 5
years. In this manner, the organization can analyze
the data collected, make appropriate changes to
policy and procedures, adopt and train these new
procedures over a normal recurrent training rotation
and then re-measure during the next audit. This
process can take three years but does not require the
completion of that time period to take advantage of
the audit results. Indeed, once true hazards are
recognized during the audit de-briefing, intervention
can take place almost immediately through
procedural changes for specific issues.

More About Qualitative Results

Qualitative vs. Quantitative

In addition to suggested areas needing improvement
the LOSA captures all the areas that crews are doing
well in. And believe me, there are going to be a lot to
them. The vast majorities of flight crews are very
professional and are very committed to safety. CRM
practices and skills are measured. The effective
management of errors and threats are captured and in
fact lend very well to new curriculum development.

Critical to this consideration is the report on how the
crews actually handled the off normal events that
came up during the flights. If threats lead to errors
that lead to more errors, the operation [safety margin]
suffers. Ultimately, if the crew experiences a
resulting undesired aircraft state, like a long landing
from an unstable approach or an off course or off
altitude condition, the safety margin is in serious
danger of breaching. But what happens more often is
that the crew eventually salvages the event and there
are no serious consequences or outcomes at all.
Crew Resource Management (CRM)

In the decision to spend money in an organization,
the question always arises as to ROI, return on
investment. LOSA is no different. But any proactive
safety program will not always prove immediate or
even short range returns from a quantitative
perspective; meaning if you invest a certain amount
of money you can not always realize a return with
interest, so to speak. Rather a qualitative result is the
goal and needs to be accepted early on.

LOSA data is critical data in exploring the human
factors associated in the normal line operation as
well. When drilling down into actual events as seen
in LOSA we see unintentional non-compliance
issues, meaning the crews just made mistakes. Those
errors may or may not be linked to an outside threat.
So when spontaneous errors are occurring, there are
usually underlying associated contributing human
factors such as crew fatigue or cockpit automation
design issues.
We also find that crews that
intentionally violate certain regulations or company
policy and procedures seem to be making a larger
number of unintentional errors as compared to crews
that do not intentionally break the rules. This may
suggest some cultural and/or crew leadership issues
resident within the organization.

Why should the safety margin surrounding the
flight operation be any less important than the
company’s financial margins?
I would suggest that it could be even more important
because of the immediate, intermediate and longer
range consequences of an accident. But how does the
organization know if a healthy safety margin exists
unless it is measured somehow? What is the quality
of the safety margin? Should the organization
believe an operation is safe because incidents and
accidents are not happening on a regular basis? How
close is the organization to having a serious accident
or incident? If the organization does not measure the
effectiveness of the safety margin, they are left with
responding to incidents and/or accidents as they
occur.

Philosophy of Safety and Making Changes
The data collection phase is the easiest part of the
LOSA. The most difficult part is deciding what to do
with the data. LOSA affords managers a measured
approach to making proactive change to avoid
changes forced upon them resulting from unpleasant
accidents or incidents.
After the areas of
enhancements are identified, a good way to start is to
choose which ones, if left unattended, could result in
serious events in the near future, and then prioritize
the rest.

LOSA will not give the kinds of quantitative results
like the outside financial auditing firm provides for
the accounting department. As mentioned before, a
quantitative approach is the wrong measuring
philosophy. LOSA provides the qualitative data that
can be used to more than reasonably extrapolate a
picture of the operation into the future with accuracy.
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you want the check airman to calibrate and train
crews in the new procedures resulting from the
LOSA it helps if they sense some ownership in the
development of the improvements.

I am aware of an airline that identified unstable
approaches as one such area that needed serious
attention. As it turned out, they were experiencing an
unacceptable rate as compared to the LOSA archive
airlines. It was actually somewhat alarming. They
formed teams to look into every area of enhancement
identified in the LOSA and when researching the
unstable approach issue it was discovered that the
flight manual definition for stable approach was very
vague.
This resulted in a wide variety of
interpretations by the crews and check airman alike.
The standards group agreed and went to work on
crafting a better definition. After the manual was
revised, the training group had a better defined policy
that could be both taught and measured in the
simulator and during line checks. Three years later,
the next LOSA measured the rate of unstable
approaches as almost non-existent! The success of
the change was due to simply defining what the
company expected for parameters during both
instrument and visual approaches, and implementing
a policy that was reasonable in terms of requiring a
missed approach or go around. Critical to this point
is that the policy or procedure was well crafted and
was reasonable to expect from the crews. In other
words the crews accepted the policy as reasonable.
This is important since if new policy and procedures
resulting from LOSA are not well written and impose
unrealistic performance requirements from the crews,
there may be resistance to comply and the next time a
LOSA is conducted, the crews may not think too
highly about having someone on their jumpseat and
may resist the audit.

More on the Safety Change Process
The investment in LOSA as a means to measure the
effectiveness of the safety margin around the flight
operation is as essential as measuring every financial
margin within the airline, if not more so. Decisions
regarding the strategy of the airline business model
are closely tied to accurate financial data and the
auditing of that data. The same philosophy in
managing the safety margin is equally appropriate
and given the possible serious outcomes of not
auditing for possible latent hazardous conditions the
ultimate future of the airline may be at stake.
Aircraft Maintenance, William Johnson
Justification of expense, or return on investment
(ROI), for maintenance human factors is not new
(FAA, 2005; Hastings, et al, 2000; Johnson, et al,
2000; and Johnson, 2006). The premise is that ROI
is most credible and effective when small examples
are used then scaled up to a larger program-level to
justify cost.
This section provides easy-to-calculate, easy-toexplain cost justification for human factors
interventions. The calculation of ROI is straight
forward. Merely determine the cost of the investment
compared to the return. The return can be measured
in money made or money saved.

Another suggestion in making changes after an audit
is to now actively involve the check airman.
Typically, check airman do not make the best LOSA
observers for two reasons. One is that they are used
to observing crews under very different
circumstances, meaning that if the crew member
performs badly during a line check, the pilot’s job
could be at stake. So changing the role to be a nonjeopardy LOSA observer may be difficult for the
check airman to remain non-judgmental as an
impartial observer just collecting data. The second
reason is that the crews may not behave normally
with a check airman on the jump seat. This has the
result of producing bad data because of the crew’s
inhibitions and possible discomfort having a check
airman on the jump seat and feeling like this could be
a line check even though it’s explained otherwise.

While this approach seems simple, measuring cost in
the real world is not. For example, maintenance
organizations seldom consider the cost of delay or
cancellation that resulted from a maintenance error.
Recent manufacturer data shows that the cost per
hour delay of a flight ranges from $16,000 each hour
on wide bodies to $2,000 each hour for older narrow
body jet airliners. This averages out to $7,500, per
hour for the airline fleet. If you consider that it costs
$100,000 every day that a wide body airliner is
grounded for maintenance, it’s easy to justify the cost
of human factors intervention programs.
The return on investment approach is best understood
if viewed from the perspective of:
• Cost vs. lost production
• R&D costs vs. return
• Cost vs. productivity increase
• “Trust me” approach

I recommend that the check airman be assigned to
lead “Target Teams” to work the issues during the
corrective action phase. All recommendations have
to be approved by the manager over standard. But if
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While the first three approaches seem intuitive the
last one, the “trust me” approach can be a hard to sell.
Here are examples.

The FAA Operator’s Manual for Human Factors
in Maintenance
In 2005 the FAA and a panel of industry,
government, and academic professionals created the
Operator’s Manual for Human Factors in
Maintenance (FAA, 2005). The web-based document
explains why each topic is critical, how to address the
topic, how to measure success, and key sources for
more information.
Chapters cover Event
Investigation, Documentation, Training, Shift
Turnover, and Fatigue/Alertness. The final chapter
addresses the issue of program sustainment and cost
justification shown below.

Cost vs. lost production is a common approach. For
example, if we deliver 4 hours of communication
training to all employees we estimate that it will
reduce gate delays by 10%. That reduction can
eliminate 20 hours of delays per week for a savings
of $140,000/week in one major hub. While this
appears to be straight forward it presents challenges
in proving that the reduction in delays resulted from
improved communication.
R&D Costs vs. return process as demonstrated by
Dr. Paul Krois and the team at the FAA Human
Factors Research Office has shown that R&D
programs can provide a significant return on the
investment. A recent example is the FAA Human
Factors Certification Job Aid that delivered an
estimated time savings of 85% in locating precertification information. The FAA Human Factors
Office has valuable tools and interesting discussion
about ROI on their Human Factors Workbench
website: http://www.hf.faa.gov/Portal/ToolsList.aspx
?CategoryID=46).

Calculating ROI in a Maintenance Environment
This section shows an example ROI and makes the
case that many small interventions can add up to big
savings and easily justify cost. Today’s Safety
Management Systems report events and identify the
risks that must be mitigated. These events are ideal
targets for ROI calculations. Usually the cost of
reported events can be estimated. At the same time,
the organization can estimate the cost to fix the cause
of the event.
The fix may include rewriting
procedures, buying new computers or other hardware,
developing and delivering training, and other such
interventions. The difficult next step is to estimate the
probability the intervention will reduce future events.
We suggest you base the probability estimate on
historical data or on your organization’s financial
targets/safety goals. The probability multiplied by the
annual cost of the events, minus the cost to fix, is the
return on the investment. Divide return by the cost of
the intervention to get the ROI ratio. A ratio greater
than zero means the ROI can be achieved in less than a
year. It is reasonable to continue even when the time
for payback is more than a year. Calculations are
described in FAA (2005).

Cost vs. productivity increase was shown in another
FAA project, the Online Aviation Safety Inspection
System (Hastings, et al, 2000). Using a “utility
analysis” based on data from 400 users of a new
computer-based job aid, the cost verses productivity
analysis showed a 19% annual reduction in the amount
of time searching for data ($16M/year). The numbers
did not include such intangibles as quality of work life,
ability to access current information, quality of data
produced and potential safety impact. However, this
ROI analysis helped justify the investment and the
long-term use of the OASIS job aid.
“Trust Me” is the final method discussed here. The
origin is a British consultant who insisted that
managers should “Trust him” when he said that
human factors interventions like training, improved
work environment, better documentation, and so
forth will improve performance and are worth the
money. He may be correct. In fact, the “Trust me”
method is quite representative of traditional airline
decision making. However, the premise of this paper
is that maintenance organizations must defend
spending on human factors and strive to go beyond
the “Trust Me” method of justifying ROI. Establish
the trust with many small examples as shown below.

Ground Damage ROI Example
A carrier was experiencing many ground damage
events, mostly associated with moving the aircraft
during scheduled maintenance activity.
They
recorded that, in one year, a specific hangar recorded
sixteen ground damage events totaling $260K.
Further investigation showed that this was an average
year for ground damage events in that hangar.
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The company applied Boeing’s Maintenance Error
Decision Aid (MEDA) to investigate the events and
made recommendations including:
• Paint aircraft specific markings on the floor
• Set up and identify clear zones around the entire
aircraft
• Adapt work platforms matched to aircraft type
• Clarify operating procedures and tell all
personnel
• Continue to audit damage on weekly basis

Disclaimer
The views expressed are those of the authors and do
not represent the FAA.
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The annual COST of events was $260K. The
estimated cost to paint floor markings, change the
work stands and procedures, and training the
personnel was $52K. Using the terms described
above, the COST TO FIX is $52K.
The company estimated the PROBABILITY OF
SUCCESS was about 75%, meaning they expected
the interventions would cut out 75% of the ground
damage. The (PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS X
COST) - COST TO FIX = RETURN. (.75 X $260K)
- $52K = $143K RETURN.
To get the RETURN ON INVESTMENT RATIO
divide RETURN by COST TO FIX ($143K / $52K =
2.75 ROI). With that kind of ROI the company
receives an ROI in slightly over 4 months (12
months/2.75=4.3). In fact, that is exactly what
happened at this carrier. This became a showcase
example for justifying other human factors
investments. This success gave the Human Factors
Manager credibility and enabled him to use a few
“Trust Me” justifications with other interventions.
This section has presented four types of ROI and
demonstrated that costs are best justified by
conducting the ROI analyses in small bits. Positive
small examples will build trust and demonstrate that
human factors interventions have great value.
Discussion
A theme common to these perspectives shows there
are a range of strategies and techniques for how
human factors can address the investment case. One
example highlights the benefit of facilitating
increased standardization in operational practices.
It should be noted that by its nature, research on
human factors issues is not guaranteed to provide a
return from the project’s costs. This includes
research outputs that support regulatory or
operational decisions.
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